CLJ Bulletin, Issue 2013, Vol 26 28 June 2013 Print this page |
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Trial - Misdirection by trial judge - Conviction based on presumption - Failure by trial judge to rule whether defence had rebutted presumption - Whether serious misdirection - Whether conviction to be set aside - Whether proviso to s. 60(1) Courts of Judicature Act 1964 applicable to uphold conviction
KARIM AB JABBAR v. PP
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
ABDUL MALIK ISHAK JCA; AZAHAR MOHAMED JCA; ABDUL AZIZ RAHIM JCA
[CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: P-05-9-2010]
18 MARCH 2013
The appellant was charged with an offence of trafficking in dangerous drugs under s. 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (`DDA') punishable under s. 39B(2) of the DDA. The facts of the case was that the appellant was driving his car when he realised the presence of police personnel in the area and thus sped away and was given a chase by Chief Inspector Rajaram (`SP6'). After a high speed chase, the appellant was subsequently arrested by the police. SP6 found a blue coloured travelling bag from the boot of the motorcar containing ten compressed slabs of dried vegetable materials which were subsequently confirmed to be 9,958.5g of cannabis. At the end of the trial, the learned trial judge was satisfied that the prosecution had established possession of the cannabis and invoked the presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da)(vi) of the DDA and convicted and sentenced the appellant to death. The appellant, in his appeal, contended that the High Court Judge had failed to make a ruling as to whether the defence had rebutted the presumption of trafficking on the balance of probabilities. The appellant contended that the failure constituted a serious misdirection and it was fatal. The appellant therefore urged the court to set aside the conviction for trafficking of the dangerous drugs and substitute it with one of possession under s. 6 of the DDA, punishable under s. 39A(2)(f) of the DDA. However, the prosecution argued that the evidence of trafficking was overwhelmingly strong and the High Court Judge had considered the defence in extenso. The issue for the court's determination in this appeal was whether the High Court Judge had misdirected himself when His Lordship failed at the end of the defence case to rule whether the appellant had rebutted the presumption under s. 37(da)(vi) of the DDA.
Held (dismissing appeal; affirming conviction and sentence)
Per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA delivering the judgment of the court:
(1) The High Court Judge ruled that a prima facie case had been established against the appellant upon perusing through the evidence of the prosecution. The High Court Judge made an affirmative finding of "possession", an important ingredient in the charge of trafficking, before the presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da)(vi) of the DDA was invoked. (paras 16 & 36)
(2) Knowledge is a mental element and is one of the pre-requisites of possession. The high speed chase against the appellant by SP6, by way of inference, showed that the appellant knew the drugs were inside the boot of his motorcar. Knowledge of the presence of the drugs in the boot of the appellant's motorcar must be imputed onto him. The circumstances suggested a nexus between his conduct and the offence, and the knowledge could thus be inferred from it. It was entirely a question of fact and such conduct was admissible under s. 8 of the Evidence Act 1950; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Brooks (foll). (paras 19 & 23)
(3) Since the evidence of trafficking against the appellant was solid, the court should invoke the proviso to s. 60(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and uphold the conviction and sentence, notwithstanding the misdirection by the High Court Judge in not making a ruling whether the presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da)(vi) of the DDA had been rebutted on the balance of probabilities; Tunde Apatira & Ors v. PP (refd); PP v. Abdul Manaf Muhamad Hassan (refd). (paras 36, 37 & 41)
Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes
Perayu dituduh dengan kesalahan mengedar dadah berbahaya di bawah s. 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (`ADB') yang boleh dihukum di bawah s. 39B(2) ADB. Fakta kes adalah bahawa perayu sedang memandu keretanya semasa dia menyedari kehadiran anggota polis di kawasan tersebut dan dengan itu memecut dan dikejar oleh Ketua Inspektor Rajaram (`SP6'). Selepas kejar-mengejar pada kelajuan yang tinggi, perayu kemudiannya ditangkap oleh polis. SP6 menjumpai sebuah beg perjalanan berwarna biru dari but kereta tersebut yang mengandungi sepuluh ketulan mampat bahan berdaun kering yang kemudian disahkan sebagai 9,958.5g kanabis. Di akhir perbicaraan, yang arif hakim perbicaraan berpuas hati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan milikan kanabis dan membangkitkan anggapan pengedaran di bawah s. 37(da)(vi) ADB dan mensabitkan dan menghukum perayu dengan hukuman mati. Perayu, di dalam rayuannya, menghujah bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah gagal membuat keputusan sama ada pihak pembelaan telah mematahkan anggapan pengedaran atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Perayu menghujah bahawa kegagalan tersebut membentuk satu salah arahan yang serius dan adalah menjejaskan. Perayu oleh itu mendesak mahkamah mengenepikan sabitan bagi pengedaran dadah berbahaya dan menggantikannya dengan milikan di bawah s. 6 ADB, yang boleh dihukum di bawah s. 39A(2)(f) ADB. Walau bagaimanapun, pihak pendakwaan menghujah bahawa keterangan bagi pengedaran adalah lebih kukuh dan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah mempertimbangkan pembelaan tersebut secara keseluruhan. Isu untuk pertimbangan mahkamah dalam rayuan ini adalah sama ada Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah tersalah arah apabila beliau gagal memutuskan di akhir kes pembelaan sama ada perayu telah mematahkan anggapan di bawah s. 37(da)(vi) ADB.
Diputuskan (menolak rayuan; mengesahkan sabitan dan hukuman)
Oleh Abdul Malik Ishak HMR menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah:
(1) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa satu kes prima facie telah dibuktikan terhadap perayu selepas meneliti keterangan pihak pendakwaan. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi membuat dapatan afirmatif "milikan", satu unsur penting dalam pertuduhan pengedaran, sebelum anggapan pengedaran di bawah s. 37(da)(vi) ADB dibangkitkan.
(2) Pengetahuan adalah unsur mental dan salah satu keperluan milikan. Kejar-mengejar pada kelajuan tinggi perayu oleh SP6, melalui inferens, menunjukkan bahawa perayu mengetahui dadah terdapat di dalam but keretanya. Perayu dianggap mengetahui tentang kehadiran dadah di dalam but keretanya. Keadaan tersebut menyarankan kaitan antara tindakannya dan kesalahan tersebut, dan pengetahuan oleh itu boleh disimpulkan daripadanya. Secara keseluruhannya, ia adalah persoalan fakta dan tindakan sedemikan boleh diterima di bawah s. 8 Akta Keterangan 1950; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Brooks (diikuti).
(3) Oleh sebab keterangan pengedaran terhadap perayu adalah kukuh, mahkamah wajar membangkitkan proviso kepada s. 60(1) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 dan mengesahkan sabitan dan hukuman, walaupun terdapat salah arahan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dalam tidak membuat keputusan sama ada anggapan pengedaran di bawah s. 37(da)(vi) ADB telah dipatahkan atas imbangan kebarangkalian; Tunde Apatira & Ors v. PP (dirujuk); PP v. Abdul Manaf Muhamad Hassan (dirujuk).
Case(s) referred to:
Alcontara Ambross Anthony v. PP [1996] 1 CLJ 705 FC (refd)
Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85 FC (refd)
Chan Pean Leon v. PP [1956] 1 LNS 17 HC (refd)
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Brooks [1974] 2 All ER 840 (foll)
Looi Kow Chai & Anor v. PP [2003] 1 CLJ 734 CA (refd)
Mohamad Radhi Yaakob v. PP [1991] 3 CLJ 2073; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 311 SC (refd)
Muhammed Hassan v. PP [1998] 2 CLJ 170 FC (refd)
PP v. Abdul Manaf Muhamad Hassan [2006] 2 CLJ 129 FC (refd)
PP v. Kang Ho Soh [1991] 3 CLJ 2914; [1991] 3 CLJ (Rep) 557 HC (refd)
PP v. Ku Yahya Ku Bahari & Anor [2002] 1 CLJ 113 CA (refd)
PP v. Yuvaraj [1968] 1 LNS 116 PC (refd)
Tan Boon Kean v. PP [1995] 4 CLJ 456 FC (refd)
Teoh Hoe Chye v. PP & Another Case [1987] 1 CLJ 471; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 386 SC (refd)
Toh Ah Loh & Mak Thim v. Rex [1948] 1 LNS 72 HC (refd)
Tunde Apatira & Ors v. PP [2001] 1 CLJ 381 FC (refd)
Yee Ya Mang v. PP [1971] 1 LNS 156 HC (refd)
Legislation referred to:
Courts of Judicature Act 1964, ss. 60(1), 92(1)
Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, ss. 12, 37(da)(vi), 39A(2)(f), 39B(1)(a), 39B(2)
Prevention of Corruption Act 1961, s. 14
Dangerous Drugs Act [Jamaica], s. 7(c)
Counsel:
For the appellant - Hisyam Teh Poh Teik; M/s Teh Poh Teik & Co
For the respondent - Nurulhuda Nuraini Mohd Nor; DPP
[Appeal from High Court, Pulau Pinang; Criminal Trial No: 45-28-2003]
Reported by S Barathi
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Declaration - Gender declaration - Application for - Application to be declared a woman and for amendment to gender information on identity card - Whether gender reassignment surgery changes person's gender to warrant change of gender description in identity card - Purpose of system of identity registration - Whether intended to be true and correct description of person's gender - Whether burden of proof discharged to warrant grant of declaration sought
CIVIL PROCEDURE: Originating summons - Gender declaration - Application to be declared a woman and for amendment to gender information in identity card - Whether affidavit evidence supporting application in originating summons showed appellant entitled to declaration as to gender - Whether burden of proof discharged to warrant grant of declaration sought
KRISTIE CHAN v. KETUA PENGARAH JABATAN PENDAFTARAN NEGARA
COURT OF APPEAL, PUTRAJAYA
SYED AHMAD HELMY JCA; ABDUL WAHAB PATAIL JCA; ABDUL AZIZ RAHIM JCA
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: A-01-84-2011]
5 OCTOBER 2012
The appellant/plaintiff (`the appellant'), by way of an originating summons, applied for, inter alia, a declaration that the appellant, who had undergone a gender reassignment surgery, be declared a woman and for the respondent/defendant (`the respondent') to change the gender information on the identity card from "Male" to "Female". The respondent had rejected the application on the ground that the application failed to comply with the procedure and guideline set out in Arahan Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara, which had a procedure that requires a gender declaration from the court. The Judicial Commissioner ("JC") in dismissing the application, held, inter alia, that (i) the appellant was born a male, was given the name Chan Wang Fei and the birth certificate reflected this; (ii) there was no error as to identity to warrant a correction under s. 27 of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act 1957; (iii) s. 6(2) of the National Registration Act 1959 did not apply as there was no error as to the appellant's gender and (iv) there was nothing in the legislation pertaining to change of gender under a gender reassignment operation as the appellant had undergone. Dissatisfied with the said decision, the appellant appealed. The appellant deposed that the unchanged gender detail in the appellant's identity card caused difficulties in seeking employment, and facing immigration in China, Hong Kong and Thailand. The issue that arose herein was whether, on the basis of the affidavit evidence supporting the application in the originating summons, the appellant had shown that the appellant was entitled to the declaration as to gender as sought.
Held (dismissing appeal)
Per Abdul Wahab Patail JCA delivering the judgment of the court:
(1) Although the application was made in Malaysia and included an order for the respondent to change the identity card description of the appellant's gender from male to female, exhibits were only documents from Thailand and Hong Kong. There were no affidavits from the makers of those documents. Further, that the appellant had difficulty with immigration in Thailand raised the question whether the sex reassignment surgery was recognised. (para 23)
(2) There was no evidence, medical and psychiatric, from experts in Malaysia as to what was gender, what made a person a male or female or whether sex reassignment surgery changes a person's gender to warrant a change of the gender description in that person's identity card. Given the purpose of the system of identity registration, it was clearly intended to be a true and correct description of that person's gender. That intention seems to be defeated if the gender description was readily changed to facilitate obtaining employment, travel, education and other personal issues. (paras 24 & 25)
(3) Upon the evidence advanced in the affidavit in support of the originating summons, the appellant had failed to discharge the burden of proof to warrant the grant of the declaration and order sought. Hence, the Judicial Commissioner had not erred in his decision to dismiss the application in the originating summons. (para 26)
Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes
Perayu/plaintif (`perayu'), melalui saman pemula, memohon, antara lain, deklarasi bahawa perayu, yang telah menjalani pembedahan perubahan jantina, diisytiharkan sebagai perempuan dan agar responden/defendan (`responden') menukarkan maklumat perayu pada bahagian jantina pada kad pengenalannya dari "Lelaki" kepada "Perempuan". Responden telah menolak permohonan atas alasan bahawa permohonan gagal mematuhi prosedur dan garis panduan yang dinyatakan di bawah Arahan Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara, yang mempunyai prosedur yang memerlukan perintah pengisytiharan jantina dari mahkamah. Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman ("PK") dalam menolak permohonan, memutuskan, antara lain, bahawa (i) perayu dilahirkan sebagai seorang lelaki, dan telah diberi nama Chan Wang Fei dan ini digambarkan melalui sijil kelahirannya; (ii) tiada kesalahan berhubungan identiti untuk mewajarkan pembetulan di bawah s. 27 Akta Pendaftaran Kelahiran dan Kematian 1957; (iii) s. 6(2) Akta Pendaftaran Negara 1959 tidak terpakai kerana tiada kesilapan berlaku berhubung dengan jantina perayu; dan (iv) tidak terdapat apa-apa dalam perundangan berkaitan dengan penukaran jantina di bawah pembedahan perubahan jantina seperti yang dijalani oleh perayu. Tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan tersebut, perayu merayu. Perayu menyatakan bahawa butiran jantina yang tidak ditukar dalam kad pengenalan perayu telah menyebabkan kesukaran-kesukaran mencari pekerjaan, dan menghadapi imigresen di China, Hong Kong dan Thailand. Isu yang timbul di sini adalah sama ada, berdasarkan keterangan afidavit yang menyokong permohonan saman pemula, perayu telah dapat menunjukkan bahawa dia berhak mendapatkan deklarasi berkenaan jantina seperti yang dipohon.
Diputuskan (menolak rayuan)
Oleh Abdul Wahab Patail HMR menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah:
(1) Walaupun permohonan dibuat di Malaysia dan termasuk perintah untuk responden menukar deskripsi kad pengenalan berkenaan jantina perayu daripada lelaki kepada perempuan, ekshibit-ekshibit hanyalah dokumen-dokumen daripada Thailand dan Hong Kong. Tiada afidavit-afidavit daripada pembuat dokumen-dokumen tersebut. Selanjutnya, kesukaran yang dihadapi perayu di imigresen di Thailand menimbulkan persoalan sama ada pembedahan perubahan jantina tersebut adalah diiktiraf.
(2) Tiada keterangan, dari segi perubatan dan psikiatri, daripada pakar-pakar di Malaysia mengenai apakah itu jantina, apa yang membuatkan seseorang itu lelaki atau perempuan atau sama ada pembedahan perubahan jantina menukarkan jantina seseorang itu sehingga ia mewajarkan perubahan deskripsi jantina dalam kad pengenalannya. Melihat pada niat sistem pendaftaran identiti, ia jelas bertujuan untuk menjadi deskripsi benar dan betul jantina seseorang itu. Niat itu seolah-olah tewas sekiranya deskripsi jantina sedia diubah untuk memudahkan seseorang itu mendapatkan pekerjaan, pelancongan, pelajaran dan beberapa isu-isu peribadi yang lain.
(3) Melihat kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan dalam afidavit sokongan saman pemula, perayu telah gagal melaksanakan beban bukti untuk mewajarkan deklarasi pembenaran perintah yang dipohon itu. Oleh itu, Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman tidak khilaf dalam membuat keputusannya untuk menolak permohonan saman pemula ini.
Case(s) referred to:
Bellinger v. Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21 (refd)
Corbett v. Corbett [1970] 2 All ER 33 (refd)
Corbett v. Corbett [1971] P 83 (refd)
Wong Chiou Yong v. Pendaftar Besar/Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara [2005] 1 CLJ 622 HC (refd)
Legislation referred to:
National Registration Act 1959, s. 6(1), (2)
Registration of Births and Deaths Act 1957, s. 27
Counsel:
For the appellant - Wong Kah Woh; M/s HL Lee & Co
For the respondent - Noor Hisham Ismail; SFC
[Appeal from High Court, Taiping; Originating Summons No: 24-102-2010]
Reported by Suhainah Wahiduddin
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Bail - Release on - Offence under s. 87A(a) Securities Industry Act 1983 - Use of manipulative and deceptive devises in scheme to defraud company - Amount involved reasonably substantial - Whether there was a likelihood of accused fleeing - Whether bail sum must reflect an amount that does not provide possibility of accused absconding
PP v. POH GAIK LYE [2012] 2 SMC 125
SESSIONS COURT, KUALA LUMPUR
JAGJIT SINGH BANT SINGH SJ
[ARREST CASE NO: 62A-311-2010]
30 JULY 2010
The accused was charged with a serious offence under s. 87A(a) of the Securities Industry Act 1983 (`the Act'), namely, indirectly in connection with the purchase of shares used in a scheme to defraud Liqua Health Corporation Berhad. The amount involved in the charge was a huge sum of RM9,750,000. The accused pleaded not guilty and was released on bail in the sum of RM800,000. The accused was also ordered to surrender all travel documents to the court. The defence submitted that although the accused faced a serious charge and the amount involved was reasonably substantial, there was no likelihood of the accused absconding, more so when she was living with her husband and her dependant child. It was further submitted that the accused had cooperated fully with the authorities, thus a bail between RM200,000 and RM300,000 with one surety should be sufficient.
Held (allowing bail in the sum of RM800,000 with two sureties):
(1) The seriousness of the offence cannot be the dominant consideration in a bail application. The larger interest of the public and the country as a whole is a factor that must be considered (Yusof Mohamed v. PP; refd). The discretion in granting or refusing bail must be exercised upon a consideration of the cumulative effect of all the factors with particular emphasis on two paramount considerations, namely (i) likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; and (ii) possibility of tampering with prosecution evidence. (para 7)
(2) The likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice in this case was indeed very high. The offence under s. 87A(a) of the Act itself carries a very severe punishment of a fine not less than one million ringgit and imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. There was also no doubt that the subject matter of the charge involved a huge sum of RM9.75 million. These two factors constituted a great incentive for the accused to abscond. (para 8)
(3) The offence being an economic offence, imposing an amount of bail which was low may provide a strong possibility or an incentive to the accused to abscond. This court had considered the fact that the accused had cooperated fully with the authorities and had weighed that with the fact that the accused had been formally charged against a very serious offence. The accused was also prepared to surrender her travel documents. The bail sum allowed must reflect an amount that did not provide any likelihood or possibility for the accused to abscond. Taking into consideration all the factors advanced by the accused, bail was allowed in the sum of RM800,000 with two sureties and with a condition that the accused surrender all her travel documents to court. (paras 11 & 12)
Case(s) referred to:
Che Su Daud v. PP [1978] 1 LNS 23 HC (refd)
Hussainara Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna 1979 Cri LJ 1036 (refd)
Lau Kung Seng & Ors v. PP [1996] 1 LNS 128 HC (refd)
Low Chit Bah v. PP [1985] 1 LNS 82 HC (refd)
Manickam & Ors v. PP [1982] CLJ 162; [1982] CLJ (Rep) 552 HC (refd)
PP v. Dato' Balwant Singh [2002] 4 CLJ 155 HC (refd)
PP v. Dato' Mat Safuan [1991] 2 CLJ 1112; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 385 SC (refd)
PP v. Wee Swee Siang [1948] 1 LNS 49 HC (refd)
Soo Shiok Liong v. PP [1993] 2 CLJ 657 HC (refd)
Yusof Mohamed v. PP [1995] 1 LNS 291 HC (refd)
Zulkifflee Hj Hassan v. PP [1987] 1 LNS 31 HC (refd)
Legislation referred to:
Securities Industry Act 1983, s. 87A(a)
Other source(s) referred to:
Mallal's Criminal Procedure, 4th edn, p 551
Counsel:
For the prosecution - Susheel Kaur (Ahmad Faiz with her)
For the accused - Ranjit Singh (Amir Hamzah Arshad with him); M/s Ranjit Singh & Yeoh
[Editor's note: The Securities Industry Act 1983 has been repealed by the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007].
Reported by Suhainah Wahiduddin